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KATHARINE DOMMETT AND LUKE TEMPLE*
Digital Campaigning: The
Rise of Facebook and Satellite
Campaigns
Studies of digital campaigning have revealed substantial change in the nature of
political campaigns. Tracing the rise of email, party websites, social media, online
videos and gamification, scholars have shown how, since the 1990s, parties have
become heavily dependent on digital technology (Gibson, 2015). In this chapter
we focus on two elements of the 2017 digital campaign: Facebook advertising and
what we term ‘satellite campaigns’. Whilst resisting claims of revolution and
transformational change (Kreiss, 2010, Williamson, Miller and Fallon, 2010) we
nevertheless argue that these digital practices have important implications for
parties’ organisational structures, practices and behaviour, as well as for public
expectations of campaigning. Through this analysis we contend that the 2017
general election provides further evidence that ‘digital media are reconfiguring
party-related engagement’ (Vaccari and Valeriani, 2016, p. 295), and agree with
Gibson (2015, p. 191) that by ‘chaf[ing] against embedded organisational rou-
tines and norms’ these developments challenge established understandings of
parties’ campaign strategies.
In examining digital, we adopt an expansive definition of the term. Alongside
an interest in social media and party websites, we also examine the organisational
digital infrastructure on which parties rely. Including digital databases, canvass-
ing systems, online phone banks, and email lists, digital infrastructure is pivotal
to parties’ diverse campaign activities by enabling participation through the
reduction of resource costs. In the analysis that follows, we employ this expansive
conception of digital to consider developments within the Labour and
Conservative parties, using these examples to illustrate wider emerging trends.
By April 2017, few were predicting an early general election, but in the days
that elapsed between Theresa May’s surprise announcement on 18 May and the
vote on 8 June, parties across the spectrum exhibited formidable online and off-
line campaigns. In the digital realm, Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Snapchat, and
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Instagram all played a part in the campaigns (Dutceac Segesten and Bossetta,
2017) with numerous graphics, videos and messages shared online. While all par-
ties were active on these platforms, emerging analysis has demonstrated the
degree to which Labour, and particularly Jeremy Corbyn, dominated support on
these platforms (Cram et al., 2017; Dean, 2017; Shephard, 2017).
Organisationally, digital proved key to volunteer mobilisation, voter identifica-
tion activities, and message targeting. Particularly prominent within the wider
picture of social and digital media use were two elements of the digital campaign:
parties’ use of Facebook advertising and the role of what we term ‘satellite cam-
paigns’ facilitated by non-party intermediary organisations such as Campaign
Together and CrowdPac. Considering these two developments in detail, we argue
that such changes represent important new evolutions in political campaigning,
and raise interesting questions for parties, the public and our expectations of
political campaigning.
1. Facebook advertising—the new normal?
Parties’ use of Facebook advertising was heralded as a key component of the 2017
campaign (Bakir and McStay, 2017; Walsh, 2017; see also Bond, 2017; Ward,
2017; Waterson, 2017). Using this tool, parties across the spectrum targeted con-
tent at specific groups of voters. Drawing on demographic data such as age, post-
code, religion, and gender, combined with indicators of users’ interests, parties
were able to identify those with, say, a passion for cycling, international travel, or
beer, and use these interests to filter messages about the environment, foreign
affairs or taxation. Parties were therefore able to identify electorally significant
voter groups, such as women over 65 in marginal constituencies, and tailor mes-
sages to their interests and ideas in attempts to win appeal. The uptake of this
tool was especially notable in the two main parties. Labour, in particular,
embraced Facebook advertising (Waterson, 2017), investing heavily at a national
level in adverts designed to promote electoral registration, but also creating a new
organisational tool, Promote, which allowed local parties to target their own
Facebook adverts. Similarly, the Conservatives invested in adverts promoting
Theresa May and questioning the leadership credentials of Jeremy Corbyn.
Reportedly, these campaigns saw Labour and the Conservatives spend over £1
million each on the platform, although formal electoral commission figures have
yet to be released (Bond, 2017). Due to their targeted nature, capturing the range
of adverts is exceedingly challenging. Initiatives such as Who Targets Me allow
users to track the adverts targeted at them (via web-browser extension) to offer
some insight into the number, form, and focus, of party adverts; however, these
data are yet to be analysed in full.
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Given the evidence that seeing a political message on a friend’s page can affect
voting behaviour (Bond et al., 2012), Facebook provides parties with a range of
new capacities that can enhance their campaigns. As a social media platform,
Facebook allows parties to connect with voters where they are, building on exist-
ing networks through sharing, comments, and reactions. In this way, an advert
targeted to one voter may be liked and shared, signalling to friends and acquain-
tances that voter’s views and affiliation. This kind of sharing enables messages to
be organically disseminated (Dutceac Segesten and Bossetta, 2017) and, as pre-
vious studies have shown, voters are increasingly comfortable sharing election
related information online (Aldrich et al., 2016, p. 174).
Whilst the prominence of Facebook in 2017 may suggest the emergence of a
new campaign tool, it is important to recognise that the use of targeted social
media advertising in the UK is part of a developing trend. This technique was
prevalent during the EU referendum the previous year (Cookson and Gordon,
2016) and at the 2015 general election the Conservatives embraced Facebook
advertising, declaring a spend of £1.2 million to the Electoral Commission on this
platform alone (Electoral Commission, 2016, p. 29). Reflecting on the success of
the 2015 digital campaign, interviews with Conservative Party strategists have
demonstrated that Facebook in particular was viewed as ‘the best place to adver-
tise’ (Interview with Conservative Party official, February 2017),1 an idea that has
infused the strategies of other parties in 2017. Moreover, despite the increased
prominence of Facebook as a campaigning space, the targeting it enables is by no
means new. Parties have long focused on identifying and targeting their vote with
the aim of refining communication strategies and identifying where the vote
needs to be mobilised on election day (Whiteley and Seyd, 2003). However, his-
torically, parties have been restricted by data protection laws to using the electoral
roll (a list of everyone registered to vote), the marked register (a list of each
elector’s voting history), commercially available data (from private companies)
and their own canvassing databases to target voters. Facebook is distinctive in
offering a new source of voter information to parties that reflects voters’ interests
and social preferences, whilst also providing the platform for communication.
From this perspective, we argue that rather than signalling radical change, the
use of Facebook in 2017 represented a ‘normalized revolution’ (Wright, 2012), as
it has adapted and extended party activities, whilst not radically changing what it
is that parties do. In reaching this conclusion, we nevertheless argue that parties’
use of Facebook has important implications for public perceptions, control, and
resource, that warrant further discussion.
1This interview was conducted as part of a wider ESRC funded research project and focused on parties
use of digital in the 2015 General Election.
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First, in regard to public perceptions, Facebook allows parties to target content
at highly localised audiences with greater precision than was previously possible
(Aldrich et al., 2016; O’Brien, 2015; Council of Europe, 2017, p. 11). This ensures
that voters hear about topics they are likely to be interested in/receptive to, which,
given that social media is an increasingly important source of news and informa-
tion for many voters (Miller, 2016), has the potential to yield significant effects
(Marengo, 2013). Whilst companies such as Amazon and Google have been uti-
lising targeting techniques to filter desirable content to users for years, parties’
use of this data is less familiar,2 and the consequences of such targeting are
unknown. Some scholars have already theorised that ‘unsolicited messages are
likely to be regarded as more intrusive than a “cold call” to a landline or flyer
posted through the mailbox’ (Aldrich et al., 2016, p. 166). Whilst the use of
Facebook data is often not as sophisticated as may be presumed, the degree to
which parties should be able to access and, indeed, purchase additional informa-
tion about voters raises potential concerns. Asides from issues of resource
inequality (discussed further below), the idea that private information is being
used by actors in the public realm to further their own electoral success raises
issues of transparency and appropriate democratic behaviour. The norms here
are not absolute, but research indicates that politicians are held to higher stand-
ards than other people (Allen and Birch, 2015, p. 71), suggesting that
commercially-accepted practices may not be tolerated to the same degree in the
political realm. In this context, questions emerge around how parties can and
should use data to connect with voters, questions that the Electoral Commission
need to consider when re-examining existing regulations.
Second, we argue that whilst the unique attributes of Facebook offer parties
advantages in terms of connectivity and reach, this platform also raises issues of
control. While Facebook can be used to target official party adverts, it is also a
forum in which unofficial campaign interventions can be made in an untargeted
manner. While the Conservatives developed videos comparing their position on
taxation to Labour, and Labour made videos citing 10 reasons to vote Labour,
many other videos from ‘unofficial’ sources could also be found. From
Cassetteboy’s remixes of political speeches, to memes mocking parties’ manifesto
positions (see for example The Metro, 28 July 2017), Facebook provides a plat-
form for a range of different political interventions. This raises a series of ques-
tions about the degree to which parties can exercise control and maintain
campaign coherence, but also about how targeted campaigns intersect with other
content. To take one example, during the 2017 election, Momentum generated
high-profile Tory attack advertisements, one of which, set in 2030, depicts a
2This is not to say that use of these data is new, but rather that such usage has been less publicly overt
before.
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young girl asking her Conservative-voting father if he hates her, to which he
replies, ‘Obviously!’ Shared entirely on digital platforms including Facebook,
Momentum activists claim the video was watched over 5.4 million times in two
days (Peggs, 2017).3 This content had huge reach, but the stylistic approach is
unlikely to have ever been sanctioned as part of an official Labour campaign, and
it may be that many voters being targeted by official Labour advertisements were
put off by the tone. The relationship between official and unofficial material, and
the interactions between targeted and untargeted social media material are there-
fore far from clear, but they suggest a tension between parties’ desire to execute
targeted campaigns and their capacity to do so on an open platform such as
Facebook.
Third, Facebook raises issues of resource. On one level, the implications are
organisational. Facebook demonstrates that digital has the potential to greatly
reduce resource costs in terms of the efficiency of disseminating political cam-
paign material, but also shows that there is a trade-off with the organisational
capacity required to utilise digital tools effectively. As Labour’s experience in
2017 shows, parties’ use of digital requires investment not only in the cost of
adverts, but also in the skills base of activists and organisational software. The
tool Promote, developed by Labour’s Digital Transformation Team, allows local
parties to identify their own target voters and deploy appropriate adverts, yet par-
ties’ ability to design text and graphics likely to win attention and be shared is by
no means guaranteed. As one digital consultancy company indicated, social
media ‘has to give people something they cannot get elsewhere, and it needs to be
designed for the environment it is appearing in. Otherwise, you’ve just made
another trivial but terrible contribution to Sharemageddon’ (DigitalsLBi, 2015, p.
4). Ensuring that party activists have the capacity to generate attractive media
poses a significant challenge to parties and may lead to a divide between ‘digitally
native’ activists (Nielsen, 2013) and those lacking digital skills. As this divide is
closely linked to generational profile, the Conservatives could be at a natural dis-
advantage when it comes to both their activist pool and their wider support base
(Bale, 2017). This suggests that while parties face common challenges, these will
be manifested in different ways depending on party context and culture.
At another level, Facebook also reveals issues of resource inequality. Whilst
parties’ financial capacities have often been unequal—restricting their capacity to
produce leaflets or commission campaign billboards—on Facebook, parties’
3It is worth noting that the video does not at any point say, ‘Vote Labour’. Rather it draws on Labour-
like slogans in Labour-like brand colours and font to finish by saying ‘Let’s Build a Different Future—
Get out the Vote on Thursday June 8th’ before providing a link to a website that does explicitly pro-
mote voting for Labour. Furthermore, a new video released after the campaign—‘They Just Don’t Get
It’’—mentions Corbyn and Momentum, but again not Labour.
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differing ability to buy advertising space raises important concerns about fairness,
equality and transparency (see Norris, 2012). Whilst Labour and the
Conservative Party used Facebook adverts extensively, other parties such as the
Greens did not have the financial capacity to devote extensive resource.
Moreover, it appears that, in certain marginal constituencies, only those parties
willing to pay inflated prices for advertising space were able to promote their
messages to voters (Cadwalladr, 2017). The importance of money for success in
this realm, and the lack of transparency around how and why content appears in
people’s Facebook feeds, raises issues about the fairness of elections.
These issues have begun to be noted by campaign regulators but, as yet, regu-
lations have not been fully adapted to reflect the realities of digital campaigns.
The Council of Europe therefore recently noted that ‘The Internet and new com-
munications technologies undermine the ability of existing regulation to main-
tain a level playing field in electoral communication between new and
established, rich and poor, corporate and civil society campaigns’ (2017, p. 2),
and yet the Electoral Commission in the UK has only partially adapted for online
campaigns. Hence, while recommending that organisations include an imprint
on their online materials (Electoral Commission, 2017, p. 11) formal regulations
have not been fully adapted in the UK to take account of issues such as campaign
funding and political transparency.4
Parties’ use of Facebook therefore raises a series of questions about the accept-
able use of personal data, parties’ control of election campaigns and the role of
money and resource in elections. These questions have important consequences
for the perceived fairness of elections, regulation and public tolerance of different
kinds of campaigning intervention. As Facebook becomes a permanent part of
the electoral landscape, these issues will only grow in pertinence.
2. Satellite campaigns
A second development in the digital sphere concerns the increased visibility of
digital infrastructure offered by non-party organisations to encourage voting and
campaigning. Though evident to different degrees, with greater activity around
the Labour Party as opposed to the Conservatives, these organisations were seen
to mobilise new activists and campaigners to parties’ causes. Innovations such as
Momentum’s ‘My Nearest Marginal’ App, fundraising sites such as CrowdPac
and campaigning hubs like the Progressive Alliance or Campaign Together were
seen to empower and connect individuals to contribute to electoral campaigns
via non-traditional routes. Organisations beyond parties were identifying,
4It should be noted that in Scotland there was a legal requirement to include a digital imprint on
online materials at the Independence Referendum in 2015.
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mobilising and organising citizens to deliver leaflets, canvass voters, and organise
on- and offline. This development represents a distinctive and important shift in
campaigning. It suggests that, in addition to Whiteley and Seyd’s categories of the
central party campaign, centrally coordinated local campaigns, and purely locally
directed campaigns (2003, p. 638), we can also identify campaigns originating
beyond party structures and control—those termed here ‘satellite’ campaigns.
Satellite campaigns can be supported by a range of different organisations,
making it useful to refer to Edwards’ (2006, pp. 8-9) notion of ‘democratic inter-
mediaries’. Edwards outlines three types of intermediary that we apply to describe
non-party organisations operating during the 2017 election. First, there are pref-
erence intermediaries, organizations that articulate and aggregate political
demands and in 2017 were evident in the form of Momentum and
Grime4Corbyn. Second, information intermediaries are seen to provide users
with political information and details on voter registration; at the latest general
election platforms like GE2017, Rize Up, and Turn Up fitted these criteria. Third,
interactional intermediaries facilitate political participation, capturing tactical
voting platforms such as Swap My Vote, tactical canvassing networks such as
Campaign Together, and the crowdfunding and campaign-match tool
CrowdPac. Whilst some organisations exhibit functions in multiple categories—
Momentum, for example, could also be classified as informational and
interactional—this framework demonstrates the different ways in which cam-
paigning initiated beyond the official party campaign can occur.
Whilst affiliate organisations such as trade unions, business organisations, and
community groups, have long provided an additional resource for parties’ elec-
toral campaigns, the capacities of digital appear to have altered previous practice.
Rachel Gibson has highlighted the capacity of digital technology, and specifically
social media, to alter the power relations between citizens and central party head-
quarters. Tracing the rise of ‘citizen-initiated campaigning’, she describes the
emergence of a ‘more devolved or “citizen-initiated” approach to campaign
organization’ (Gibson, 2015, p. 183). The creation of tools by party candidates
and teams that enable citizens to canvass voters on remote phone bank applica-
tions, raise money online, organise campaign events or disseminate party materi-
als on social media are seen to enable ‘autonomous action and tactical control of
campaign operations at the local level on a scale that was not possible in the pre-
digital era’ (Gibson, 2015, p. 187). Numerous other scholars have picked up on
this theme: Vaccari and Valeriani (2016, p. 306) have argued that social media
are helping ‘new digital foot soldiers to emerge and allow existing members to
expand their repertoires’, whilst Lilleker and Jackson (2010, pp. 74-75) have
discussed the internet’s ability to encourage ‘individual production and
user-generated content’, creating supportive material, endorsing campaigns,
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and sharing campaigns through online networks (see also Chadwick and
Stromer-Galley, 2016).
The idea of satellite campaigns mirrors these themes, but extends them by rec-
ognising the increasing importance of intermediary, unofficial, organisations
beyond parties that facilitate and promote campaigning activities. A campaign
can be classed as satellite when vote-seeking activism is primarily driven by inter-
mediary organisations without the control of a party. The rise of digital media
platforms does not determine that satellite campaigning will take place; however,
it does greatly facilitate it. Satellite campaigns have the capacity to challenge ‘the
professionalized top-down approach that has dominated post-war elections, par-
ticularly over the past three decades’ (Gibson, 2015, p. 183). However, these
organisations should not be seen as a threat to parties as institutions because, pri-
marily, they are not vote-seeking themselves, but also because they remain reliant
on party infrastructure and activity. For instance, Campaign Together lacks its
own canvassing system and instead organises by directing new activists towards
existing party-led campaigns they identify in key marginal seats—the organisation
brands itself as a part of a progressive alliance united by an aim to ‘stop the
Tories’. Utilising digital media, intermediary organisations help to bring together,
train, mobilise, and inspire individuals who may not engage through traditional
(and often staid) party structures and have the potential to provide a considerable
additional resource for parties. As a regional organiser of Campaign Together
reflected:
I think why people got involved with campaign tools like Campaign
Together and what Momentum were offering is because a lot of people,
and I heard this from talking to people, were similar to me in that they
were intimidated to go to [party] meetings or they didn’t enjoy them
and they found it hard to get involved and they wanted to—this felt like
something autonomous or indirect. (Interview with regional organiser,
July 2017)
These bodies innovatively utilise important resources in the form of email lists,
digital media presence, and organisational tools (such as Slack, WhatsApp and
Facebook) that help to get people involved. This potential is significant when
considering the principle-agent problem parties usually face when using members
(who often lie at the ideological extremes) to communicate with voters. As Enos
and Hersh’s work (2015) has shown, parties’ reliance on members that are unrep-
resentative of the general public can prove counterproductive in attempts to cam-
paign. By drawing on the energies of citizens who may not feel sufficiently
enthused to join a party, but who may nevertheless share party values, satellite
campaigns can provide parties with a wider set of advocates, who may be better
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placed to articulate their appeal. Digital therefore helps to enable the transition
back and forth between being a party-sympathizer to carrying out the role of a
party-activist, further blurring the lines between models of party membership
and affiliation (Chadwick, 2007, 2017; Scarrow, 2015; Guaja, 2015). This can
occur in the confines of one party or across party boundaries, as organisations
like Campaign Together directed citizens to campaign for a range of different
parties in order to minimise the Conservative Party’s electoral success.
Intermediary bodies can therefore enhance party campaigns by providing new
activists and resource.
An additional benefit of satellite campaigns is the potential for innovation. As
organisations less restricted by legal requirements and responsibilities, these
bodies have the space to innovate and trial new tools that parties may be wary of
promoting. In this way, Momentum developed the ‘My Nearest Marginal’ tool
which allowed campaigners to identify marginal seats and offer lifts or car shares
with others from their area who wanted to travel to campaign. This tool helped
to target the campaigning activities of hundreds of volunteers into the areas
where campaigning was deemed to have the most significant effect. The capacity
of a central party to develop and regulate such software is far more complex due
to legal duties (especially when encouraging car sharing), hence innovation might
emerge more easily when originating from beyond parties (Williamson, Miller
and Fallon, 2010).
Despite these advantages, satellite campaigns also raise multiple questions
regarding party control, specifically in terms of how parties should link to and
work alongside these campaigns. Although some intermediary organisations have
permanent infrastructure, others emerge purely around elections. Whilst, as
Marengo (2013) argued, electoral campaigns are an opportunity to reach out to
and empower non-party members, there is a challenge in capitalising on such
links throughout the electoral cycle. It is not yet clear how embedded these organ-
isations are in the campaign landscape, and so, even for strongly partisan organi-
sations, parties cannot necessarily rely on—or even predict—their support.
Furthermore, it is unclear whether the support offered by satellite campaigns is
always welcomed. In the high-profile seat of Sheffield Hallam, where Labour
defeated the former Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg, the contribution of sat-
ellite campaigns was unclear. On the one hand the winning Labour candidate
Jared O’Mara was quoted as saying, ‘The contribution of Momentum members
in South Yorkshire and beyond was exemplary . . . It was a blessing to have them
on board campaigning to get me elected.’ (The Week, 2017). However, an inter-
view piece in The Guardian provides a different take:
Momentum has, incidentally, tried to claim Hallam for one of its victo-
ries. But O’Mara isn’t having this. ‘No, no. I reject that entirely. I was
Digital Campaigning 197
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/pa/article-abstract/71/suppl_1/189/4930846
by University of Sheffield user
on 20 April 2018
grateful for their help, but it was a victory for every shade of red in the
party. There are some really good eggs in there, but there are also a few
people that . . . well, I maybe want to put a bit of distance between them
and myself.’ (Cooke, 2017)
Parties will therefore need to consider whether and how they relate to intermedi-
ary organisations and satellite campaigns, and whether there may be institutional
advantages to creating links that help to sustain and harness this enthusiasm.
This is particularly important because organisations such as Campaign Together
and Momentum maintain their own activist lists and communication channels
that parties do not control. This lack of direct access to a reserve army of addi-
tional volunteers renders parties reliant either on building productive links with
intermediary bodies, or developing their own systems by which to capture con-
tact information and attempt to involve such individuals in party activities. Yet
such activities may undermine what is attractive about satellite campaigns: that
they are flexible and orbiting, not integrated into official party campaigns. They
appeal to activists who consider themselves as ‘doers’ and not ‘joiners’ (Scarrow,
2015). If these organisations become more embedded in the campaign landscape
in the long term, negotiating this boundary will be key.
3. Conclusion
The 2017 digital election campaigns may well be remembered for the normalisa-
tion of Facebook advertising and for the developing significance of satellite cam-
paigns, but we should remember that digital remains one of many tools used by
political parties. Like the printing press, typewriter or computer before it, digital
technology enables parties to carry out existing functions more efficiently and
within more expansive parameters, but its capacity to transform current practice
is not deterministic. Rather, political activists, and especially those within parties,
must consciously decide to engage with digital tools to promote a different kind
of practice if lasting change is to occur (Lilleker and Jackson, 2010, p. 92).
Clearly, parties’ use of Facebook advertising relocates activities that have previ-
ously been conducted using internal party databases on to a digital social media
platform. Traditional electoral campaigning has not been revolutionised in this
sense— it has just gained a new dimension alongside face-to-face canvassing, leaf-
leting, and phone banking. But the normalisation of this type of campaigning
does raise important questions about public acceptance of such tools, as well as
the complexities of regulating the digital sphere and the subsequent power of
finance to buy electoral advantage.
Digital media in the general election of 2017 has also facilitated the growing vis-
ibility of satellite campaigns. However, the success of these campaigns and the
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intermediary organisations that drive them rests on contingent factors that make
it difficult to assess at this stage both their influence and permanence as a feature
of electioneering. Much of this infrastructure appears left-leaning or more specifi-
cally driven by support for the current Labour leader, and hence may be far more
unfamiliar to the Conservative Party or UKIP. Given the unpredictability of the
2017 results, and our understanding of the difference that grassroots campaigns
can make (Fisher, Cutts and Fieldhouse, 2011), this suggests that more tradition-
ally right-wing parties could benefit from promoting and encouraging such bodies
to emerge. However, if there is no organic support for such developments, parties
could be accused of ‘astroturfing’ such campaigns, which is unlikely to get them
the support and resources they need to target marginal seats in an effective way.
Cumulatively, these insights reveal that there is considerable ambiguity about
the implications of these trends, specifically in terms of what we expect from
campaigns. Whether driven by ethical concerns over the conduct and regulation
of parties’ Facebook advertising, or reflecting ambiguity over the boundaries and
scope of parties’ ‘official’ campaigns, our understanding of what constitutes elec-
toral campaigning is evolving in line with developments in the digital realm. For
parties it appears that there are considerable benefits to be gained from experi-
menting with new technology, learning from others, and perhaps most contro-
versially, being willing to relinquish some control over their election campaigns.
And yet the longer-term implications of these trends are by no means clear. The
public’s tolerance of new practices, and their willingness to embrace different
organisational forms and ideas, requires further investigation to examine what is
wanted and expected of parties’ campaigns today.
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